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IN THE SUPR.EMF. COTJP.T OF THP. STATF. OF' HTAH 
~TATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-P.esponnent, 
-v-
BRYON nALE PBTERSON, 
Defenoant-Appellant. 
~RIEF OF RF.SPONDENT 
----------
Case No. 182!lR 
STATEMF.NT OF THE NATURE OF THF. CASE 
The appellant, Bryon Dale Peterson, was charged with 
one count of aggravated burglary, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann., ~ 76-6-203 (1953), as amended, and two counts of 
aggravated assault in violation of Utah Code Ann.,~ 76-5-10~ 
(1953), as amended, and was tried before a jury in the Seventh 
Judicial District Court in and for Carbon County, the 
Honorable non v. Tibbs presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THF: Il)WFR COURT 
The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated 
burglary, a first-degree felony, agqravated assault, a third-
degree felony, and assault, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial 
court sentenced appellant to iMprisonrnent in the Utah State 
Prison for a term not less than five years,. which may be for 
life, for aggravated burglary, toqether with a fine of 
Sln,non~ for a term not to exceed five years for aggravated 
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assault: and for a term not to exceea six months for assault, 
all terms to run concurrently. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirrnance of appellant's 
conviction. 
STA'.":'EMFN'I' OF. THE FACTS 
Mrs. Sandra Dotson owned a home at 296 North 100 
West,~~rice, Utah (T. R). Due to leg surgery she slept on a 
couch in the livinq room, adjacent to the kitchen (T. 15). In 
the early morning of September 1, 1981, appellant entered 
Sandra's home, walkeo through the kitchen, and then peered 
through the doorway into the living room where Sandra was 
sleeping (T. 11, 12). Awakened by noises in the kitchen, 
Sandra noticed the appellant in the doorway and asked "Who in 
the hell are you?" (T. 12, 13). The appellant did not 
respond: instead, he approached Sandra and placed both hands 
around her neck (T~ 13, 15). Sandra struggled, but the 
appellant beat her about the head and face, sat on her body 
and then strangleo her ( T. Hi). Due to this vie ious assault, 
Sandra lost consciousness ('.":'. lR). 
Tamm~ Dotson, Sandra's daughter, occupied a basement 
bedroom immediately below the living room where her mother 
slept (T. 43). Tammy was awakened on the ~orning of September 
1, 19Rl by an alarm clock set for 6:30 a.m. and her mother's 
-/.-
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scream, which occurred simultaneously. She put on her robe, 
walked up the stairs into the kitchen and saw from the doorway 
the appellant sitting on top of her mother (T. 44). 
Concerned, Tammy asked "Mom, are you alright?" (T. 46). Her 
mother did not answer, but the appellant turned and looked at 
her (T. 47). Tammy ran for the back door but appellant caught 
her from behind by grabbing her wrist (T. 47). The appellant 
placed his hands around Tammy's neck and strangled her until 
she lost consciousness (T. 47). Moments later, Tammy regained 
consciousness, saw appellant beating and choking her mother, 
arrl then she ran out the back door to the home of a next-door 
neighbor, Ed McKinney (T. 49). 
At 6:20 a.m. on September 1, 1981, Ed McKinney was 
awakened by screams corning from his front door (T. R9). 
Answering his door, he was told by Tammy that something was 
wrong at her house (T. 89). Mr. McKinney ran to the house, 
entered the back door and walked into the kitchen ( T. 89). 
Mr. McKinney then observed the appellant lying over Sandra 
Dotson ( T. 90). Mr. McKinney asked "What the heck' s_ going on 
here?" (T. 91). The appellant responded "Nothing" and he then 
got up, walked past Mr. McKinney and left through the back 
door (T. 91-93). A kitchen light clearly illuminated the 
appellant's face as he left the Dotson home (T. 93). 
Another neighbor, Richard Rathers, heard Tammy's 
screams and approached the house (T. 100). While in the 
street in front of the Dotson home, Mr. Rathers saw appellant 
-3-
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run from the house, get into an orange van and drive off (T. 
101, 102). 
At trial, both victims, Sandra and Tammy Dotson, ana 
both neighbors, Ed McKinney ann Richard Rathers, positively 
identified the appellant as the assailant who entered the 
Dotson home on the morning of September 1, 1981 (T. 20, 46, 
91, 104). 
POIN'J:' I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPFRLY GRANTF.D 
RF.:SPONDEN':r:''S JOINDF.R MOTION. 
Appellant's claim of error arises from a series of 
events which occurrea within two months of his necember 21, 
1981 trial. 
The original information filed against appellant 
contained two counts of aggravated assault and one count of 
aggravated hurglary. nuring a November Q, lClfU preliminary 
hearing, appellant was bound over only for the two counts of 
aggravated assault. Appellant was arraigned for the 
aggravated assault charge on November 16, 1Q81 and trial was 
set for November 21, 19Rl (T. 237). 
On November 30, 1981, respondent refiled the 
aggravated burqlary charge against appellant. Both the 
preliminary hearing and arraignment for the refiled charge 
-4-
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were held on December 16, 1981. Following the hearing, 
appellant was bound over for the aggravated burglary charge 
(T. 238). On the following day, respondent moved the district 
court to join the aggravated assault and aggravated burglary 
charges. The trial court granted the joinder motion on the 
first day of trial, December 21, 1981 (T. 5). Concerning the 
joinder motion, the prosecuting attorney asserts that prior to 
November 27, 1981, he communicated to appellant's counsel his 
inten~ion to both refile and join the aggravated burglary 
charge (T. 246). Appellant's counsel denies that any mention 
was made of joining the refiled charge with the existing 
charge (T. 249). 
Based upon this summary of events, appellant 
contends that he was unable to adequately prepare a defense to 
the refiled aggravated burglary charge, and was thus 
prejudiced by the trial court's joinder order. Appellant's 
claim, however, lacks merit. 
Utah Code Ann., S 76-1-401 (1953), as amended, 
provides in part that a: 
"single criminal episode" means all 
conduct which is closely related in time 
and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a single criminal 
objective. 
Here, appellant's single objective was to maliciously assault 
the victim, and in so doing, he committed the separate crimes 
-~ 
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of aggravated assault and aggravated burglary. Roth crimes 
are closely related in time ana incident to his criminal 
objective. Thus, responnent was entitled to join these 
different crimes in separate counts in the same information. 
Utah Code Ann., ~ 77-35-9 (1953), as amended. 
However, ~ 77-35-9(d) provides that: 
If it appears that a defendant or the 
prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of 
offenses in an indictment or information 
••• the court shall order an election of 
separate trials of separate counts • • • 
or provide such other relief as justice 
requires. 
Appellant was not prejudiced because there was sufficient time 
between joinder and the date of trial for counsel to prepare a 
defense. Since appellant's claim is insufficient time to 
prepare a defense, it can profitably he compared to analogous 
claims arising from a trial court's refusal to grant a 
continuance. 
In State v. McOueen, 14 Utah 2d 311, 383 P.2d 921 
(lq~3), the defendant was charged with the crime of robbery. 
Following a dispute, the defendant dismissed his counsel less 
than two days before trial. ~he court appointed other counsel 
for the defendant. Shortly before trial defense counsel moved 
for a continuance and the trial court denied the motion. 
Following his conviction, the defendant appealed, contenainq 
that the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance was 
abuse of discretion. Affirming the conviction, this Court 
-6-
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concluded from the record that defense counsel was given 
adequate time to prepare for trial. See also: Johnson v. 
State, 90 Nev. 352, 52~ P.2d 969 (1974) (change in counsel on 
eve of trial and motion to continue denied). 
In the instant case, the interim period between· 
joinder and trial of four days, provided defense counsel 
sufficient time to prepare a defense to the refiled charge. 
More importantly, defense counsel was tol~ in a r>hone 
conversation on or before November 27, 19Rl that respondent 
intended to refile on the aggravated burglary charge. Based 
upon this information, appellant can hardly claim surprise. 
Furthermore, preparation for the alibi defense woulo not be 
altered at all following refiling of the a~gravated burglary 
charge because the charges arose from the same criminal 
episode. 
Appellant claims, however, that he was allowed 
insufficient time to investigate another defense to the 
refiled aggravated burglary charge: whether the victim had 
consented to appellant's entry onto the premises. The issue 
of consent is a question of fact discoverable from the parties 
to whom and from whom the consent was given--i. e., the 
appellant and the victim. Since this issue of consent is 
rather limited, appellant strains a bit when he contends that 
four days was not adequate time to fully explore the issue. 
The recorn .does not support appellant's claim that 
he was prejudicea by joinder of the charges. Thus, the trial 
-i-
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court properly joined the aggravated burglary charge with the 
aggravated assault charge. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ARRAIGN THE 
DEFENDANT ON THE CHARGE OF AGGRAVATED 
BURGLARY WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
In a February 17, 1982 hearing following trial, 
appellant moved the court for a new trial contending that he 
had not been formally arraigned on the aggravated burglary 
charge~refiled on November 30, 1981 (T 235, 240). The court 
denied appellant's motion, ruling that the clerk at the start 
of trial read the information to appellant and that the clerk 
indicated that a not guilty plea had been entered, placing 
into issue all claims made by respondent (T. 254). 
Appellant contends that this error is sufficiently 
egregious as to warrant a new trial. However, the law is well 
settled that if a defendant proceeds to trial without 
objecting to a failure to arraign on a charge, he waives his 
right to a formal arraignment, e.g., People v. Sanders, 80 
Ill. App. 3d 809, 400 N.E.2d 468 (1980): State v. Anderson, 12 
Wash. App. 171, 528 P.2d 1003 (1974). See State v. Budau, R6 
N.M. 21, 518 P.2d 1225 (1974) (formal arraignment is not an 
indispensable stage in a criminal proceeding). 
The facts of Anderson, supra, are sufficiently 
similar to those of the instant case to allow comparison. 
-8-
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There, the defendant was charged in an initial information of 
violating a firearms regulation and taking an automobile 
without the owner's consent. Eight days later the defendant 
was arraigned on the two charges. In the interim an amended 
information was filed against defendant charging two counts of 
burglary. Defendant, however, was never arraigned on the 
amended information. Following a trial on the merits, the 
defendant was found guilty of all charges. In a hearing 
following trial, the defendant moved the court for a new trial 
because he had not been arraigned on the burglary charges. 
The trial court denied the motion and the defendant appealed. 
Affirming the conviction, the Washington Court of Appeals 
held: 
The record shows defendant had a full 
trial on the merits as if a plea of not 
guilty had been entered on the two counts. 
He proceeded to trial without objection 
and without asking for a continuance after 
announcing he was ready to proceed to 
trial. By his conduct defendant 
effectively waived his right to a formal 
arraignment [citations omitted]. 
we find no violation of due process. 
528 P.2d at 1005. 
Here, as in Anderson, the appellant had actual 
notice of the refiled charge and had a full trial on the 
merits as if he had pled not guilty. By proceeding to trial 
without objection, appellant waived his right to a formal 
arraignment. Furthermore, before the start of trial all 
-9-
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charges were read to the appellant along with a statement that 
a plea of not guilty had been entered. Any error committed 
effected no substantial rights of the appellant and was thus 
harmless. Utah Code Ann., S 77-35-30 (1953), as amended. 
Therefore, the trial court properly denied appellant's motion 
for a new trial. 
POINT· III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT 
RESPONDENT WOULD BE PERMITTED TO REBUT 
APPELLANT'S ALIBI WITNESS. 
In a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the 
respondent informed the court that it intended to put on 
Officer Dean Holdaway to rebut the testimony of Mrs. Levan 
Seeley, an alibi witness (T. 170). Officer Holdaway was to 
testify about a statement made by Mrs. Seeley at the time of 
the crime that would be inconsistent with her alibi testimony 
(T. 171). Appellant objected because Officer Holdaway's name 
had not been submitted to him as a possible rebuttal witness 
(T. 17.2). The respondent stated that Mrs. Seeley was not 
identified as the person making the inconsistent statement 
until the day before trial; thus notice to appellant could not 
be given (T. 169). Following this exchange, the trial court 
ruled that putting on Officer Holdaway as a rebuttal witness 
was proper (T. 172). On this appeal, appellant claims the 
trial court ruling was erroneous. 
-10-
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Section 77-14-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, 
states in pertinent part: 
(1) • •• The prosecuting attorney, not 
more than five days after receipt of the 
[defendant's alibi] list provided herein 07 at such other time as the court may 
direct, shall file and serve the defendant 
with the addresses, as particularly as are 
known to him, of the witnesses the state 
proposes to offer to contradict or impeach 
the defendant's alibi evidence. 
. . . 
(3) If a defendant or prosecuting attorney 
fails to comply with the requirements of 
this section, the court mav exclude 
evidence offered to establish or rebut 
alibi. However the defendant may always 
testify on his own behalf concerning 
alibi. 
(4) The court may, for good cause shown, 
waive the requirements of this section. 
In State v. Case, Utah, 547 P.2d 221 (1976), this 
Court addressed facts and issues similar to those raised in 
the instant case. There, defendant ws charged with aggravated 
robbery and during trial asserted a defense based upon alibi. 
Days after the robbery, a friend of the defendant confronted 
the victim store clerk and stated that the defendant was the 
culprit. During testimony at trial, the friend denied making 
the statement and the store clerk was recalled as a rebuttal 
witness although no notice had been given the defendant. 
Following conviction, the defendant appealed to this court 
alleging as reversible error the State's failure to give 
notice of rebuttal witnesses. Affirming the conviction, this 
Court held: 
-11-
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[N]evertheless in this matter defendant 
knew that [the store clerk) would become a 
witness against the defendant and her 
testimony respecting the conversation with 
[defendant's friend] would have been known 
to the defendant had it been inquired 
into. fHis friend) havinq been subpoenaed 
by the defendant was undoubtedly 
interviewed bv the defendant or his 
counsel and w~ must assume that the 
defennant was apprised fully of his 
knowleoge of the facts he would testify to 
if called. There is no showing that the 
prosecution intentionally attempted to 
make anv concealment of the facts 
reqardi~g the alibi or its refutation. We 
are of the opinion that the trial court 
was justified in waiving the requirements 
of the statute. 
Id. at 523 (emphasis added). Enlarging upon its Case holding, 
this Court, in State v. Haddenham, Utah, 585 P.2d 447 (1978), 
stated: 
If defendant's implied knowledge_ as to the 
State's rebuttal witnesses would justify 
waiving the statutory requirements in the 
rcase] case, then a fortiori such analvsis 
should hold true where the rebuttal ~ 
witnesses had both already testified and 
defennant actually knew the content of 
their testimony. 
Id. at 44A. 
In the instant case, appellant knew that Officer 
Holda\1ay would be called as an adverse witness and appellant 
also had implied knowledge about Mrs. Seeley's conversation 
with Holdaway had he inquired thereof. Furthermore, Holdaway, 
the rebuttal witness, had actually testified earlier. Thus, 
-12-
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invoking Case and Haddenham 
- , the trial court properly ruled 
that respondent could put on its rebuttal witness without 
notice to the appellant. 
POINT IV 
ANY IMPROPRIETY IN A QUESTION PROPOUNDED 
BY RESPONDENT DID NOT·- AFFECT THE 
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF APPELLANT AND THUS 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HIS MOTION 
FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
During presentation of the defense, the appellant 
called as a witness Evan Reid (T. 179). During cross-
examination of this witness, respondent asked "Mr. Reid, are 
you Mr. Peterson's parole officer?" (T. 180). To this 
question appellant interposed an objection which was sustained 
by the trial court (T. 181). Based in part upon this 
question, appellant moved for a new trial (T. 244). The 
motion was denied by the trial court (T 254), and raised as 
error on appellant's appeal before this Court. 
Section 77-35-24(a), Utah Code Ann. (1953), as 
amended, states: 
The court may, upon motion of a party or 
upon its own initiative, grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if there is any 
error or impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights 
of a party. 
Consideration of Case, supra, is also instructive in 
the resolution of this issue. There, during examination of a 
-13-
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witness, inadvertent reference was made to the fact that the 
defendant had left the prison the day before the alleged 
crime. The defendant moved for a mistrial which was denied by 
the court. Following his conviction, the defendant appealed, 
claiming as error the court's denial of the mistrial Motion. 
Affirming the conviction, this Court held that denial of a 
mistrial was proper because no further mention was made by 
either counsel or the court about defendant's prison term and 
the prosecution did not intentionally seek to elicit the 
information. 547 P.2d at 223. 
In an effort to distinguish the instant case from 
Case and to come within the ambit of~ 77-35-24(a), appellant 
claims that the question asked Mr. Reid was an intentional 
effort to discredit him. The record contains no evidence that 
the State intended to discredit appellant,' nor did counsel 
raise such a claim in the conference convened to consider the 
objection. In fact, during the new trial motion hearing, the 
State claimed the question was only designed to obtain the 
.. 
witness' occupation (T. 248). Furthermore, any person sitting 
as a witness may be examined about his background and 
occupation for the purpose of aiding the jury in its 
evaluation of the witness' testimony and credibility. State 
v. Brewer, 26 Ariz. App. 408, 549 P.2d 188, 195 (1976). 
Thus, the offending question was neither intended to 
discredit appellant nor did it have a substantial adverse 
effect upon his rights. Therefore the trial court properly 
denied the new trial motion. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RF.FUSBD 
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO STRI~~ THF. WOP~ 
"AC1G'RAVATED" FROM ALL COUNTS OF THE 
INFORMATION. 
After the State concludea its case in chief ana 
during a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the 
appellant moved the court to strike the word "aqgravated" from 
each count in the information. The court below denied the 
motion, and appellant claims this denial was error. 
prov ides: 
Utah Code Ann.,~ 76-5-l03(l)(b) (l<l53), as amended, 
A person commits aggravated assault 
if he commits assault as defined in 
section 76-5-102 ana: 
He uses a aeadly weapon or such means or 
force likely to proouce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
Appellant's attack on the trial court's order is premised upon 
his conclusion that the victim, Sandra Dotson, suffered no 
serious bodily injury. Appellant relies upon State of Utah in 
the Interest of William N. Besendorfer, Utah, 568 P.2d 742 
( 1977) and claims that because the victim there suffered more 
severe injuries than Sandra and since this Court ruled that 
the injuries to the victim there were the result of an 
assault, not aggravated assault, the trial court here erred 
when it denied appellant's motion. Appellant's analysis, 
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however, is fundamentally flawed. It was the position of the 
respondent, and the fair import of the evidence presented, 
that appellant used "such means of force likely to produce 
death" and not necessarily to produce serious bodily injury 
(T. 166). Since the aggravated assault statute is stated in 
the disjunctive, such a showing is sufficient. It is not 
necessary to prove death or serious bodily injury occurred, 
but only that the actor used means or force likely to have 
that result. 
The facts contained within the record show that 
appellant attacked Sandra, placed both hands around her neck 
and applied sufficient pressure to cause her to black out. 
Clearly, such force would likely have caused her death had not 
Sandra's daughter and neighbor appeared to frighten appellant 
away. Thus, the facts presented in the State's case in chief 
were sufficient to require appellant to put on its defense to 
the aggravated assault charge. 
Appellant also contends that the alleged b~rglary 
was not aggravated and thus the word "aggravated" should have 
been stricken from the information. Utah Code Ann., S 76-2-
203( 1) (b) ( 1953), as amended, states: 
A person is guilty of aggravated burglary 
if in attempting, committing, or fleeing 
from a burglary, the actor or another 
participant in the crime causes physical 
injury to any person who is not a 
participant in the crime. 
-16-
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The requirement here is physical injury, not serious bodily 
injury, and it is a term equivalent to "bodily injury" defined 
in Utah Code Ann.,~ 76-l-60l(a) (1953), as amended: "'Bodily 
injury' means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition." Due to appellant's attack, the victim, 
Sandra Dotson, certainly suffered as a minimum physical pain 
and some impairment of physical condition; thus appellant's 
conduct falls within the ambit of s 76-6-
203( l) (a), the aggravated burglary statute • 
. ' 
/ Appellant also argues that since S 76-6-203 is based 
upon "physical injury", a term not statutorily defined, it 
must be void for vagueness. This claim is groundless because 
the term "physical injury" is equivalent to the term "bodily 
injury" which is defined by the Utah Criminal Code. It is 
also a phrase of common meaning which needs no further 
definition. 
In sum, appellant in his attack caused bodily injury 
and used such force that was likely to produce death~ thus the 
trial court properly denied his motion to strike the word 
"aggravated" from all counts in the information. 
POINT VI 
THE $10,000 FINE IMPOSED AT SENTENCING WAS 
NEITHER EXCESSIVE NOR AN ABUSE OF TRIAL 
COURT DISCRETION. 
For appellant's conviction for aggravated burglary, 
a first-degree felony, the trial court imposed a fine of 
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$10,000 (T. 232, 233). On this appeal, appellant claims that 
the fine was excessive and disproportionate to the seriousness 
of the offense. 
states: 
Utah Code Ann.,~ 76-3-20l(l)(a) (1953), as amended, 
Within the limits prescribed by this 
chapter, a court may sentence a person 
adjudged guilty of an offense to any one 
of the following sentences or combination 
of such sentences: 
(a) To pay a fine~ or ••• 
In addition, Utah Code Ann., S 76-3-301(1) (1953), as amended, 
states: 
A person who has been convicted of an 
offense may be sentenced to pay a fine not 
exceeding $10,000 when the conviction is 
of a felony of the first degree. 
In State v. Harris, Utah, 585 P.2d 450, 453 (1978), this Court 
further noted: 
Upon conviction of a crime whether by 
verdict or by plea, the matter of the 
sentence imposed rests entirely within the 
discretion of the court, within the limits 
prescribed by law (emphasis added). 
Appellant claims, however, that since neither of the 
victims incurred pennanent injuries, disfigurement or long-
term medical expenses, imposition of the fine was abuse of 
trial court discretion. The purpose of a fine is not solely 
for making restitution to one's victims. Thus, Utah Code 
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Thus, Utah Code Ann., S 76-1-104 states in relevant part: 
The provisions of [the Utah Criminal 
Code] shall be construed in accordance 
with these general purposes. 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of 
offenses. • • • 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are 
proportionate to the seriousness of 
offenses and which permit recognition of 
differences in rehabilitation 
possibilities among individual offenders. 
The trial court, in effecting ~ -··76-1-104, could have decided 
that in this particular case the maximum fine, together with 
imprisonment, would most clearly deter the appellant from 
future crime and most appropriately punish him for crimes 
already committed. Based upon this view of the sentencing 
procedure and the seriousness of appellant's crime, the fine 
imposed was neither excessive nor abuse of trial court 
discretion. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY PERMITTED THE 
STATE TO AMEND THE INFORMATION AT THE 
CLOSE OF _,ITS CASE. 
on the second day of trial in a hearing outside the 
presence of the jury, the State moved the court to amend the 
information so that § 7n-5-103(l)(b) would be the basis for 
the aggravated assault charge instead of§ 76-5-103(l)(a). 
The state argued that such an amendment would more clearly 
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reflect the evidence already presented (T. 166). over 
appellant's objection the trial court granted the motion 
amending the information (T. 167). 
The appellant argued during the motion, and argues 
here, that he had come prepared to defend the aggravated 
assault charge on the basis of§ 76-5-103(l)(a), serious 
bodily injury, not § 76-5-103(l)(b), force likely to produce 
death. 
Utah Code Ann.,~ 77-35-4(d) (1953), as amended, 
permits an "information to be amended at any time before 
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and 
the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." 
Appellant admits that no additional or different offense was 
charged, but he argues that his substantial rights were 
prejudiced by the amendment. However, weighing the evidence 
presented at trial up to the time of the motion, such a claim 
is groundless. 
Utah Code Ann.,§ 76-l-60l(a) (1953), as amended, 
defines "serious bodily injury" as a: 
bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, 
protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
The record indicates that the victim, Sandra Dotson, did not 
suffer pennanent disfigurement or loss of a body member or 
organ, but was placed under a substantial risk of death. 
-20-
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Essentially, for this particular case, ~ 76-5-103( 1) (a) was 
eqivalent to§ 76-5-103(l)(b) because the force used by 
appellant was likely to produce death. Furthermore, the 
amended information would require no change in appellant's 
defense at trial nor would additional preparation be required. 
This Court recently decided State v. Ricci, Utah, 
P.2d (Case No. 18165, filed September 29, 1982) in 
which the appellant contended it was error to allow an 
amendment to the information after the parties rested to 
I 
include the language "or remained in" in a burglary charge. 
Appellant made the same claim in Ricci as is advanced here, to 
which this Court responded: 
This contention is without merit 
since the amendment did not change the 
basic charge from the burglary alleged to 
some other charge. The information 
charged defendant by Title and Section, 
which apprised him of the statutory 
offense and which included the very phrase 
about which defendant now takes issue. 
Id. at p. 2 of the opinion. Since no substantial rights of 
appellant were prejudiced, the trial court properly permitted 
the information to be amended. 
POINT VIII 
RESPONDENT PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
AT TRIAL TO SUPPORT APPELLANT'S 
CONVICTION. 
Appellant argues that evidence proffered in support 
of his alibi was sufficiently compelling to render 
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insufficient, as a matter of law, that evidence.which 
reasonably supports his conviction. 
When faced with an insufficiency of evidence claim, 
this Court accords great deference to conclusions reached by 
the jury in matters solely within its province: 
It is the exclusive function of the jury 
to weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses, and it is 
not within the prerogative of this Court 
to substitute its judgment for that of the 
factfinder. This Court should only 
interfere when the evidence is so lacking 
and insubstantial that reasonable men 
could not possibly have reached a verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
State v. Lamm, Utah, 60~ P.2d 229, 231 (1980) (emphasis 
added). Thus, this Court's function is not to determine guilt 
or innocence, the weight to give conflicting evidence, or the 
credibility of witnesses. State v. Lamm, supra: State v. 
Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761 (1979). In State v. Logan, Utah, 
563 P.2d 811, 814 (1977), this Court recast its review 
standard in rather succinct terms: "[U]nless there is a clear 
showing of lack of evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld." 
Furthermore, this Court has stated that its review of the 
evidence and those inferences reasonably deduced therefrom 
will be conducted in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980). 
In addition, the defendant bears the burden of establishing 
that the evidence presented at his trial was so inconclusive 
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and insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt concerning his guilt for the crime charged. 
Id. at 1168. 
The only credible evidence presented at trial which 
supported appellant's alibi was the testimony of appellant's 
father. His father, Mr. Charles Peterson, testified that he 
heard appellant come home at 5:30 a.m. on September 1, 1981 
(T. 151). Although Charles Peterson did not see his son come 
home, he heard the gate open and moments later heard the 
refrigerator door open (T. 151, 159). The probative value of 
Charles Peterson's testimony is further reduced because his 
sister-in-law and her husband were also living in the Peterson 
house (T. 157). 
Most damaging, however, is the positive eyewitness 
identification of appellant by Sandra and Tammy Dotson and 
their two neighbors. When viewing the totality of the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, a 
reasonable mind would entertain no reasonable doubt about 
appellant's guilt. Therefore, his conviction was supported by 
sufficient evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was accorded a complete and fair trial 
which resulted in a conviction overwhelmingly supported by 
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the evidence. Therefore, respondent respectfully requests 
this Honorable Court affirm appellant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this 13th day of April, 1983. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
A&;;j~~ 
ROBERT N. PARRISH 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Bryce K. 
Bryner, Attorney for Appellant, 690 East Main Street, P.O. Box 
444, Price, Utah, 84501, this 13th day of April, 1983. 
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